On April 19, 2022, information about a severe vulnerability in recent versions of Java shook up the security community.

Last month, one of the three NIST finalists for post-quantum signature schemes has received its final nail in the coffin: Ward Beullens, a PostDoc at IBM Research, published a practical key recovery attack against the Rainbow signature scheme.

During the last couple of weeks, a little shake went through parts of the security community. This was caused by a preprint by Professor Dr. Claus Peter Schnorr titled “Fast Factoring Integers by SVP Algorithms”, published on the IACR’s E-print Server.

Since the announcement of the SolarWinds supply chain attack, intensive analysis has been done by Crowdstrike, FireEye (with additional details), Microsoft, Symantec, SolarWinds, and many others, to understand the attack’s workings both within SolarWinds and in the targeted networks. Here we focus on the code signing procedures, which seemingly failed at SolarWinds but likely could have mitigated the risk of the attack if they had been implemented and enforced to a higher standard.

There is no silver bullet when it comes to securing “the” Internet of Things, instead, a careful analysis of the individual application is needed. In this article we explore a methodical, yet pragmatic approach to securing IOT devices.

The business world today is built on the pervasive use of cryptography, to authenticate people and processes, to secure communications, and to protect sensitive data.

When migrating their business-critical applications and cryptography to the cloud, banks and financial institutions face a number of concerns. The push to adopt cloud computing for the sake of efficiency and innovation must be balanced with the responsibility to protect sensitive data and processes.

The first practical chosen-prefix collision attack on SHA-1 was announced in January 2020 by researchers Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin: “SHA-1 is a Shambles”.